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Abstract
Value of life issues traditionally pertain to insurance of the losses of accident
victims, for which replacement of the economic loss is often an appropriate concept.
Deterrence measures of the value of life focus on risk-money tradeoffs involving small
changes in risk. Using market data for risky jobs and product risk contexts often yields
substantial estimates of the value of life in the range of $3 million to $9 million. These
estimates are useful in providing guidance for regulatory policy and assessments of
liability. However, use of these values to determine compensation, known as hedonic
damages, leads to excessive insurance.

I. Introduction
Society routinely places a value on life in a variety of ways. Government
regulators must make decisions regarding the level of regulatory costs that should be
incurred to reduce risks to life and health. The courts provide compensation after
fatalities, both to compensate families for their loss and, in some cases, to provide
deterrence as well. In our daily lives we routinely make decisions that either reduce risks
of death, such as the purchase of a crashworthy car, or increase risks to our lives, such as
the purchase of a small fuel efficient car that exposes us to the risk of injury. These
choices all reflect an implicit value of life. The value attached to life and health in these
various contexts has different economic content and different dollar magnitudes.
The natural question that arises is which measure of the value of life is the
appropriate way for society to approach such decisions. The key issue in selecting the
pertinent value of life is to establish the purpose for which the number is intended. It is
noteworthy that in no case are we asking for the amount of money a person would be
willing to pay to avoid certain death or the amount that a person must be paid to accept
certain death. Rather, the focus is usually either on the value of a statistical life in which
the matter of concern is the risk-money tradeoff involving small mortality risks or the
appropriate level of compensation after a fatality for which there is the desire to provide
insurance for the survivors.
One can potentially distinguish four potential conceptualizations of the value of
life. First, what is the appropriate value of life to establish efficient incentives for safety
for deterrence and accident prevention? Second, what is the appropriate value of life
from the standpoint of the principles of optimal insurance and appropriate compensation
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of accident victims? Third, if our objective is to make the victim whole, as in tort
liability contexts involving nonmonetary damages, what should be the appropriate level
of compensation? Unlike the property damage case in which making the victim whole is
an appropriate framework for determining efficient levels of deterrence and
compensation, this approach to valuing life will neither be the appropriate deterrence
measure nor the appropriate insurance measure, and it has no role to play in an efficiency
based value of life framework. Finally, if regulatory expenditures to save lives are very
unproductive, is there any level at which their effect on risk leads to the loss of a
statistical life rather than a health benefit?

II. Overview of Valuation Approaches
The Value of Statistical Lives
Economic discussions of the value of life almost invariably focus on the value of
a statistical life, considering an individual facing a very small probability of death. 1
What is that person’s willingness to pay to eliminate some small risk of death? For very
small changes in risk, these willingness to pay measures should equal the values for
people’s willingness to accept increases in risk. The underlying impetus for this
approach is the broader maxim in the public finance literature that the value of the
benefits for any public policy consists of the willingness to pay of the citizenry for these
benefits. 2 Within the context of policies that reduce risk, this value becomes the
willingness to pay of those affected by the risk reduction, hence the value of the statistical
life. This measure should be appropriately cast as the value from the standpoint of
deterrence rather than compensation. The thought experiment embodied in the
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methodology is a tradeoff between money and a very small risk of death. This approach
considers how much individuals need to be compensated to face certain death or how
much their heirs would need to be compensated after their death to provide appropriate
insurance. These events involve discrete fatality outcomes, where the compensation
decision is an ex post judgment. In contrast, the value of a statistical life is a prospective
measure that in effect establishes the appropriate price society is willing to pay for small
risk reductions.

Insurance and Human Capital Measures
Non-economists speculating on what must be meant by the economic value of life
typically think of accounting measures, such as the present value of lost earnings. 3 These
human capital measures are not an appropriate guide to the value of life from the
standpoint of preventing accidental deaths. As will be indicated below, statistical
evidence on the value of a statistical life suggests that these values are roughly an order
of magnitude greater than the present value of the earnings of the individual exposed to
the risk.
In general, one’s financial resources do not necessarily provide a bound on the
value of a statistical life because the level of expenditure is low. It would not be entirely
inconsistent for an individual to be willing to spend more than one-one thousandth of
one’s income to reduce the risk of death by 1/1,000. Most prospective risk reductions,
whether from safer consumer products or increases in regulatory costs, involve
sufficiently small probabilities of death that the budget constraints implied by one’s
earnings are typically not binding. Those who are more affluent will, of course, generally
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be willing to pay more to prevent risks to their life and health, but this is quite different
from saying that one should value risks based on the proportional share of one’s income
that corresponds to the pertinent probability of death.
Calculation of the present value of the economic loss, including lost earnings,
services, and medical expenses, is totally appropriate from the standpoint of providing
insurance and compensation to the accident victim. From a theoretical standpoint, the
efficient level of insurance when faced with actuarially fair insurance opportunities is to
equate the marginal utility of income in the no accident state with the marginal utility of
income after an accident. 4 In situations involving financial loss, the utility function is
unchanged by the accident. The prescription that marginal utility levels before the
accident and after the accident be the same consequently leads to the full replacement of
the economic loss. Doing so keeps both the utility and the marginal utility of income at
the level it would have had if the accident had not occurred. From the standpoint of the
accident survivors, addressing their economic loss so as to provide efficient insurance
requires that they receive full compensation of the economic losses that have been
incurred. The impetus for the insurance justification is to insure the accident survivors
rather than provide for the welfare of the deceased.

The Make Whole Principle
In many accident contexts, the principle for setting damages is to make the victim
“whole” after an economic loss by compensating for the value of the loss that has been
incurred. 5 This approach not only provides for full compensation of the loss, but also
establishes appropriate incentives for accident avoidance in situations in which all
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accident losses are monetary. The underlying rationale for making individuals whole
from an insurance standpoint stems from the principles for optimal insurance when
actuarially fair insurance is available. Optimal insurance will provide for sufficient
compensation to equate the marginal utility of income in both the accident and the no
accident state of the world. Since the utility function is unchanged by an accident, as the
only losses are purely financial, equating marginal utilities is tantamount to equating the
overall utility level had the accident not occurred.
Making the victim whole is seldom sensible in the case of permanent health
impairments or in extreme cases such as death. Money is not as valuable in promoting
individual welfare after such catastrophic outcomes. This underlying assumption that
health impairments diminish the marginal utility of money lies at the heart of law and
economics debate over setting the appropriate level of pain and suffering compensation.
If there is no such diminution in marginal utility, then the total value of the compensation
an accident victim receives for the financial loss plus any pain and suffering
compensation should be sufficient to make the victim whole. For nonfatal injuries, once
the financial needs are met by the compensatory award, the task of pain and suffering
payments would be to make the victim indifferent to the health consequences. In the case
of fatalities, it is clearly implausible to make the victim whole except in rare instances in
which one’s bequest motive is overwhelming. Indeed, empirical evidence in Viscusi and
Moore (1989) indicates that the value placed on these bequests is in fact less than the
value of consumption when one is alive, as one would expect. Purchases of life
insurance are also consistent with this result as few people provide their heirs with
enough coverage to prevent any income loss.
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In most of the law and economics literature, analysts have analogized to the
fatality case and have asserted that other accidents, such as brain damage and paraplegia,
for example, also reduce the marginal utility of income. As a consequence, full
compensation restoring the accident victim to the pre-accident level of welfare is not
efficient from an insurance standpoint. Whether an accident that adversely affects health
increases or decreases one’s marginal utility is, however, an empirical question. All
adverse health effects are not simply equivalent to a certain fraction of being dead.
However, all available evidence suggests that such health reducing accidents diminish the
marginal utility of income. The findings for work-related accidents reported in Viscusi
and Evans (1990) generate estimates of the shape of individual utility functions in the
pre-accident and post-accident states. Job accidents do reduce the welfare enhancing
properties of income to a sufficient extent that the optimal replacement rate for the typical
work injury is not 100%, but is rather 85%. Similar findings for multiple sclerosis in
Sloan et al. (1998) also imply that this severe illness reduces the marginal utility of
income as well. No empirical evidence has been published in the literature to suggest
that accidents causing heath impairments raise the marginal utility of income. There is
consequently no economic justification for levels of post-accident insurance
compensation that will restore the fatally injured or seriously impaired accident victims to
their pre-accident welfare level.

Risk-Risk Analysis
The final concept pertaining to the value of life emerged as a salient concern in
the 1990s, but can be traced back to previous economic contributions. 6 Regulations may
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create risks as well as reduce them. In some cases, there may be direct risk effects of the
regulation. Earlier consumer product safety regulations protected children’s sleepwear
from fire hazards with the flame retardant chemical Tris. Unfortunately, this chemical
was found to be carcinogenic, producing an unintended risk increase from the regulation.
A second class of risk-risk effects is that all economic activity has associated injuries and
fatalities, including that resulting from regulatory requirements. For example, regulations
that stimulate manufacturing activities, such as the production of pollution control
equipment, will generate injuries and deaths that occur in the normal course of all
production efforts. 7
By far the most prominent risk-risk concept, also known as health-health analysis,
pertains to the health opportunity costs associated with regulatory expenditures.
Allocating society’s resources to regulation or other efforts diverts these expenditures
from the usual market basket of consumer goods, which includes health care, housing,
and other health-related consumption items. Economists have developed a value of life
type concept with respect to such expenditures, where this value pertains not to how
much it is worth to save a life. Rather, the question is what level of expenditures in terms
of the cost per life saved is so high that these expenditures become counterproductive in
terms of affecting personal health risk levels. This approach represents an opportunity
cost measure of the value of life that will set an upper limit on the level of expenditures
that could possibly be sensible even if one’s sole concern were with health risks,
irrespective of the cost.
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III. The Value of Statistical Lives
The underlying principle for establishing the value of a statistical life is that the
focus is on the risk-money tradeoff for small risks, not the value of an identified life.
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that you are faced with a 1/10,000
risk of death. This risk is comparable to estimates of the long run fatality risk that has
faced the typical American worker. Suppose that this is a one time only risk that will not
be repeated and that you can draw on your future resources to buy out of the risk. Also
assume that the death is immediate and painless. How much would you be willing to pay
to eliminate this risk?
Very few respondents indicate that they would be willing to sacrifice all of their
economic resources in return for this risk reduction. As a result, life clearly has a finite
value, and the only question is determining its magnitude. Similarly, few respondents
indicate that they are willing to pay nothing to reduce the risk. If the risk scenario can be
conveyed in a credible manner, respondents typically indicate a figure such as $500 to
eliminate the risk.
How might one use such estimates to calculate the value of life? Suppose that we
had 10,000 respondents, each of whom faced a 1/10,000 risk of death. Overall, there
would be one statistical death expected in this group. If each person is willing to pay
$500 to eliminate the risk, a total of $5 million could be raised to eliminate the one
statistical death to the entire group. Thus, $5 million would be the value of a statistical
life in this situation. If the respondents had indicated $200 in terms of the willingness to
pay, the corresponding value of life would have been $2 million. Similarly, one can view
the value of life as simply the value per unit risk, or the willingness to pay for the risk
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reduction divided by the probability of death, which gives the same answer as the
procedure above.
Utilizing survey questions to elicit the value of life is a frequent procedure,
particularly for health outcomes such as cancer deaths for which reliable market data
often do not exist. A preferable approach is to analyze tradeoffs implied by actual
decisions involving real risks rather than creating hypothetical survey scenarios. While
there are no explicit market trades involving the certainty of death, there are a variety of
contexts in which there are transactions in which a probability of death is one component
of the transaction. Purchases of cars with differing safety characteristics reflect the value
that consumers place on their lives as well as fuel economy, comfort, and other attributes.
Housing market decisions that expose one to various forms of pollution will reflect these
valuations, as will job risk decisions of workers and purchases of safety devises, such as
smoke alarms.
The principle underlying all such assessments can be traced back to Adam
Smith’s (1776) analysis of compensating differentials, which was developed more than
two centuries ago. Smith suggested that workers would need to be compensated for jobs
that posed additional risk; otherwise, these positions would not be as attractive as safer
job alternatives. In much the same way, houses in hazardous neighborhoods will
command a lower price, and safer cars will command a higher price. The practical task
for economists has been to identify market situations in which there is sufficient data to
disentangle the risk-money tradeoff from tradeoffs involving other product attributes,
whether it be fuel efficiency of automobiles or the promotion prospects of employment.
The overall literature dealing with these multiple attribute concerns has been called
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hedonic wage analysis or hedonic price studies, as the focus is on obtaining qualityadjusted measures of prices or wages, where one of the quality components is the health
and safety risk. 8
By far the most extensive literature on money-risk tradeoffs has focused on labor
market estimates. The availability of job risk data as well as detailed information on
workers and the characteristics of their employment has enabled analysts to estimate the
wage-risk tradeoffs for the United States as well as in numerous other countries. Before
considering these estimates, it should be noted at the outset that there is no reason why
these studies should yield the same value of life estimates. The value of life is not a
natural constant, such as e or π. Rather, it simply reflects the risk-money tradeoff of the
sample of the individuals being examined. People will differ in their implicit values of
life depending on their willingness to bear risk, their affluence, and other factors.
Figure 1 indicates the manner in which the labor market generates wage-risk
tradeoffs. The curve FF represents a market offer curve for a particular firm. For higher
levels of risk, the firm is willing to offer a greater wage because the costs of workplace
safety to the firm are less at higher risk levels. The additional wage premium for greater
risk diminishes because the cost reductions made possible by the increase in risk decrease
in size as the risk rises. The curve GG represents a different firm and its associated wage
offer curve. In practice, all that is relevant to any particular worker is the highest wage
for any given risk level from among the various wage offer curves available in the market
place.
The preferences of workers may differ as well. The curve EU 1 represents the set
of points for worker 1 that yield the same level of expected utility. As the risk level
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increases, the wage that the worker must receive to maintain the same level of welfare, or
expected utility, is higher. In addition, this compensation must rise by an increasing
amount as the risk level becomes greater. The comparable constant expected utility locus
for worker 2 is EU 2 . Each worker has a whole set of such constant expected utility loci,
where the direction of preferences is in the northwesterly direction. What is shown in
Figure 1 is the constant expected utility locus for worker 1 and for worker 2 at which they
are able to select the job risk-wage combination that gives them the highest level of
welfare. Thus, EU 1 is tangent to the offer curve FF at the job risk level p 1 , and EU 2 is
tangent to GG at the risk level p 2 . The slope of the constant expected utility curves and
the market offer curves are identical at these points of tangency, as the wage-risk tradeoff
simultaneously reflects the wage workers require to accept small increases in risk as well
as the costs to the company of altering the risk level. Statistical estimates do not isolate
the tradeoff for any particular worker but instead estimate the locus of such tangencies
using a curve such as XX in Figure 1. The result economists generally report is an
average wage-risk tradeoff or slope of XX for the range of empirical estimates.
More specifically, economists usually estimate an equation, which in its linear
form, is
Wage = α + β 1 Death Risk +

n

∑

β i Job and Worker Characteristics i + ε.

i=2

The coefficient of β 1 represents the wage-risk tradeoff, controlling for the personal
characteristics of the worker and the job. If the wage and death risk variables are each in
annual terms, β 1 is the implicit value of a statistical life for that sample.
These empirical estimates clearly pertain only to local rates of tradeoff for small
changes in risk. Suppose, for example, that one were to ask worker 1 to move from a risk
11

p 1 to p 2 . Would it be appropriate to use the estimated market rate of tradeoff XX to
determine how much wage-risk compensation worker 1 would require for such an
increase in risk? Using the value of XX, one finds that instead of requiring w 1 (p 1 ) as the
wage rate, the wage w 2 (p 2 ) that is sufficient to induce worker 2 to take the riskier job
perhaps might suffice. However, examining EU 1 , which is the locus of points that gives
the worker the same level of expected utility as at the initial risk-wage position of p 1 ,
w 1 (p 1 ), we find that a higher wage at w 1 (p 2 ) is required. Whereas market wage-risk
tradeoffs are pertinent to analyzing small changes in risk, large risk increases would
command a larger wage premium than the market estimates suggest. To estimate the
amount of compensation required for non-incremental risk changes, one would need to
know the shape of workers’ utility functions, which can in fact be estimated, as was done
in Viscusi and Evans (1990). For the logarithmic case, the result was that utility was
equal to log Income in the injured state and 1.007 log Income in the healthy state.
Table 1 summarizes selected studies from the value of life literature, which now
consists of dozens of estimates. An early influential study is that by Thaler and Rosen
(1976), which found an implicit value of life of just under $1 million. However, their
sample focused on workers in particularly high risk jobs, with an annual fatality risk on
the order of 1/1,000. Workers who are most willing to bear risk will sort themselves into
these very risky jobs and, as a result, one will find a lower value of life than in more
representative samples. The estimates in Viscusi (1979) for workers facing an annual
death risk of 1/10,000 indicated an implicit value of life on the order of $4.9 million.
These estimates also appear to be sensitive to the risk measure used, as shown in Moore
and Viscusi (1988a), for which the value of life obtained using the Bureau of Labor
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Statistics death risk measure is $3 million, whereas the value of life using the National
Traumatic Occupational Fatality Survey measure is $8.7 million. Estimates for foreign
countries found by Kniesner and Leeth (1991) indicate a value of $3.9 million for
Australia and $13.8 million for Japan. Overall, most value of life estimates cluster in a
range of $3-$9 million for most studies in the literature.
A wide variety of studies have also examined tradeoffs outside the labor market.
In much the same way as there is a wage-risk tradeoff, one can also estimate a price-risk
tradeoff. Estimates in Table 2 for seatbelt use, cigarette smoking cessation, automobile
safety, and housing price responses to hazardous waste risks all indicate value of life
estimates that are broadly in the same range as those in labor market studies. Some of the
estimate in these tables differ because in some cases very strong assumptions are needed
to generate value of life estimates, and in other instances there are very strong elements
of self selection that affect the value of life figures that are generated. For example,
cigarette smokers would be expected to exhibit relatively low values of life, and in fact
they are at the bottom end of the range of the estimates in Table 2. These findings for
cigarette smokers are consistent with those in Hersch and Viscusi (1990) for nonfatal job
risks, for which they found that the greatest implicit value of an injury was for individuals
who wore seatbelts and did not smoke, the lowest implicit value was for people who both
smoked and did not wear seatbelts, with people who engaged in only one of these risky
behaviors being in the intermediate range. In short, there is substantial heterogeneity in
individuals’ value of life, and this heterogeneity gets reflected in people’s safety
decisions and in subsequent market estimates of the value of a statistical life.
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Analysts have also utilized survey techniques to estimate the value of life. These
approaches, which sometimes come under the heading of contingent valuation, elicit
people’s willingness to pay for various kinds of risk reduction. Estimates for automobile
accident death risks and for cancer indicate value of life figures of the same order of
magnitude as those found in labor market studies. 9 Interview studies of this kind are
most useful in indicating how the value of life may vary depending on the kind of death,
such as cancer versus an accidental death. They also may be instructive in indicating
how the value of life differs for populations of a different age or demographic profile
than the typical worker or consumer in the market-based studies.

IV. Regulatory Applications of the Value of Life
A Profile of Regulatory Costs per Life
Historically, the federal government valued statistical lives saved by government
policies using human capital measures. In some instances, this approach was
characterized as the “cost of death,” where it included both the present value of medical
expenditures as well as income loss associated with death and injury. This approach
shifted in the early 1980s after the Reagan administration at least nominally imposed a
requirement that the agency show that the benefits of its regulatory efforts exceed the
costs. In 1982 the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) proposed a
hazard communication regulation. This proposal was the most expensive regulation
proposed to date in the Reagan administration. It was rejected by the Office of
Management and Budget because in its view the associated costs exceeded the benefits.
OSHA then appealed the dispute to then Vice President Bush. My reanalysis of the
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standard which was prepared at the request of these agencies found that the benefits
exceeded the costs if one valued the lives saved using the value of life methodology
rather than the cost of death. In particular, this shift alone increased projected benefits by
roughly a factor of 10. 10
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget now recommends the use of the
value of life methodology for benefit assessment for all proposed federal regulations.
While agencies now routinely assess benefits using these value of life figures, the results
of the analysis do not always bind government policy. In most instances, the restrictive
legislative mandates of the regulatory agencies require that they issue protective
regulations irrespective of benefit-cost balancing. As a result, with the notable exception
of the U.S. Department of Transportation, which undervalues life somewhat by using a
figure of just under $3 million per life, the risk regulation agencies often issue regulations
that have inordinately large costs.
Table 3 summarizes the cost effectiveness of a wide variety of regulations. The
columns of the table indicate the name of the regulation, the year the regulation was
issued, the pertinent agency, the cost per expected life saved, and the cost per normalized
life saved. This normalization transforms all lives into accident equivalents. Thus,
prevention of cancer cases generally has less of a life saving effect on a quantity-adjusted
basis, where the normalization has been done based on the discounted expected number
of life years saved relative to accidental deaths using a 3% rate of discount. The effect of
this normalization is to make the health oriented regulatory policies, which already are at
the bottom of the table in terms of cost effectiveness, even less efficient than they would
seem to be based on the unadjusted cost per life saved.
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Suppose that one establishes a cutoff for desirability of a policy in terms of the
cost per life saved. Let all efforts with a cost exceeding $6 million per life fail a benefitcost test and all policies with a lower cost pass such a test. A range such as this is
consistent both with the results of the labor market and other value of life studies as well
as with the values currently used by most federal agencies. Many regulations in Table 3,
particularly those issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), pass a benefit-cost test. These
agencies tend to be outliers because their legislative mandates do not exempt them from a
benefit-cost test. Moreover, the Department of Transportation selects its regulatory
interventions based on the value of life performance. Indeed, this agency consistently has
used a value of life below the midpoint estimates of the value of life in labor market
studies so that there may be additional transportation regulations that would be warranted
but which are not now being adopted.
In contrast, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and OSHA routinely
issue regulations with considerable costs per life saved. For the last five regulations
appearing in Table 3, the costs per life saved were on the order of $5 billion or more. Put
somewhat differently, the U.S. Department of Transportation refrains from issuing
regulations that are 1,000 times as cost effective as these efforts. These high levels of
regulatory costs are even greater once one considers the cost per normalized life saved
column in Table 3, which adjust for latency periods and the length of life saved. All
regulations with higher costs than the rear lap/shoulder belts for autos regulation issued
by NHTSA have costs per normalized life saved that are excessive given this measure.
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Salient Policy Issues
While the value of life estimates are useful measures of the risk-money tradeoff
for accidental deaths to the populations exposed to these risks, because of individual
heterogeneity in the value of life the appropriate measure may differ depending on the
regulatory context. The first potential adjustment is with respect to individual age. Risk
reducing policies do not confer immortality, but merely extend one’s life. Although there
have been some estimates of the quantity-adjusted value of life in the literature, 11 as well
as estimates indicating how value of life estimates in surveys vary with age, 12 such
quantity adjustments are still being refined. The most extreme instances of quantity
adjustments arise when the regulation affects the lives of children or people with very
short life expectancies, such as those with advanced respiratory ailments. Air pollution
regulations promulgated by EPA are particularly affected by such concerns since it is
largely the elderly and young children who are protected by these efforts. Some
regulatory analyses at least attempt to indicate the distribution of the populations affected
and, in some cases, adjust for the amount of life expectancy lost (or more correctly, the
discounted number of life years lost), but such adjustments remain controversial.
A second salient aspect of heterogeneity is with respect to income. Human capital
measures for the present value of lost earnings as compensatory damages are directly
proportional to one’s income level. Estimates of the implicit value of job injuries also
suggest that there is a strong income elasticity, which also may be close to 1.0. 13
Presumably there is similar variation in people’s willingness to pay for risk reduction so
that based on the usual benefit measures the value of life for more affluent populations
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should be greater. The government currently makes no such distinctions, a practice that
in effect represents an implicit form on income redistribution.
Although income-based differences in the value of life are particularly
controversial when government expenditures are involved, if the regulatory structures
will impose costs that ultimately will be largely borne by the consumers themselves, they
would presumably be less controversial since they will be fostering the safety levels that
an efficient market would generate, and there would be no governmental subsidy to the
more affluent consumers. A case in point is that of airline safety, since airline passengers
have above average levels of income. The U.S. Department of Transportation does not,
however, permit the FAA to use a higher value of life for airline safety than for other
agency policies in which it is government funds being expended, such as for improved
guard rails on highways. In this case, however, safety regulations are not at the public’s
expense. They are requirements that must by paid for by the airlines and will be reflected
in the ticket price.
Failure to recognize potential heterogeneity in the value of life may also lead to
policies that are less protective of the environment for future generations. Society’s
willingness to pay for safety has been rising over time with increased affluence.
Recognizing the greater value that future generations will place on environmental quality
and safety will lead to more protective environmental policies than assuming these
valuations would remain constant. Because future generations cannot carry out bargains
with those now alive and compensate us for our protective actions, the result may be that
the level environmental quality may be lower and at a less efficient level than if such
transactions could be executed.

18

Other refinements of the value of life that are often salient include recognition of
the quality of life years at risk as well as whether the risks are voluntary and have
received some form of compensation. If people have voluntarily chosen to incur risks
through a market transaction, then it is often the case that this self selection process will
make those exposed to the risk a non-random sample of the population and hence will
have a lower average value of life among their group. In addition, the fact that these
individuals have received compensation for the risk may affect the perceived equity of
the outcome as compared to a situation in which the risk tradeoff is similarly at the
efficient level but no compensation has in fact been paid.

V. Value of Life in the Courts
Torts Cases
A routine part of wrongful death, discrimination, and wrongful discharge cases is
to calculate the economic loss suffered because of the wrongful behavior. This loss
amount typically is the human capital measure based on the present value of lost
earnings. In the case of a person who is deceased, there is also often a subtraction for
person consumption expenditures and taxes, though these practices vary by state. These
calculations are now standard practice and have become a relatively uncontroversial
exercise except for differences between the experts in their projections of likely earnings
trajectories and in their selection of the discount rate for bringing these projections back
to their present value.
Whereas regulatory agencies have adopted the value of life methodology almost
universally, the courts continue to rely on the human capital measure. The principal
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rationale for this continued emphasis is that the human capital approach is more pertinent
to the insurance function of damages, which is to meet the economic loss of the
survivors. The value of life concept can be viewed more appropriately as a deterrence
concept, and awarding damages based on this amount would lead to excessive insurance
as compared to what the individual would have chosen if insurance had been available
before the accident on an actuarially fair basis.
Use of the value of life methodology as a substitute for the human capital measure
as a compensation approach has come under the heading “hedonic damages.” Numerous
economists have attempted to introduce this concept in a variety of jurisdictions, but this
approach has generally been rejected because of the mismatch between the value of life
concept and the compensatory objectives of damages. 14 Hedonic damages are more
pertinent from the standpoint of deterrence, which most courts recognize as a punitive
damages concept, but even then there is the danger that there will be excessive insurance
provided to accident victims. 15
Value of life statistics nevertheless are useful in determining liability. In
particular, a company’s expenditures on safety should reflect an appropriate risk-money
tradeoff. Consider the analysis prepared by Ford with respect to the gas tank design for
the Ford Pinto. Although Mother Jones magazine received a Pulitzer Prize for an article
suggesting that this analysis was prepared with reference to rear impacts that were the
object of tort litigation, the assessment by Schwartz (1991) suggests that it pertained to
rollover risks and regulatory matters. However, General Motors did prepare a similar
analysis with respect to fires resulting from side impacts on the gas tank so that
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consideration of the highly publicized Ford analysis is instructive of the general approach
that seems to be prevalent within the auto industry.
The cost of relocating the gas tank was $11 per unit for a total cost across the car
population of $137.5 million. Relocation of the gas tank would eliminate 180 burn
deaths and a similar number of burn injuries, the values for which Ford chose amounts
comparable to the court awards at that time -- $200,000 for a burn death and $67,000 for
a serious burn injury. The result, as is shown in Table 4, is that Ford’s estimate of the
total benefits of relocation were just under $50 million, which is far less that the costs. If,
however, Ford had used the value of life measure of $5 million for fatalities, this safety
improvement alone would exceed the cost of the gas tank relocation. If, for sake of
concreteness, we assume that burn injuries are half as valuable as saving lives, then the
total benefits of relocating the gas tank are almost 10 times greater than the cost.
Focusing on court awards rather than the public’s willingness to pay for greater safety
will lead companies to greatly undervalue safety improvements. Liability in these
contexts should be judged using value of life reference points reflecting appropriate riskmoney tradeoffs rather than the much smaller human capital values that fail to reflect the
full value of greater safety to those exposed to potential injury.

Risk-Risk Analysis
The very high costs per life saved of government regulations reflected in Table 3
have not gone unnoticed by the courts. In an influential opinion, U.S. Federal Court
Judge Steven F. Williams indicated that such regulations may in fact be
counterproductive since the health costs of wasteful regulatory expenditures exceed the
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direct risks reduced. 16 This decision in turn stimulated a letter from the Office of
Management and Budget to OSHA, suggesting that OSHA consider this approach in its
regulatory analyses. 17 To date this methodology has not yet been adopted as official
agency policy. The available evidence at that time was based on the work by Keeney
(1990), who used direct estimates of the link between the mortality rate and income level
leading to an estimate in the range of $7 million, or $12.5 million in 1992 prices. 18 A
variety of other estimates similarly based on the correlation between income and
mortality indicate that expenditures ranging from $2 million to $12 million on efforts that
do not reduce heath risks directly will have an opportunity cost of one statistical life. 19
These estimates imply that expenditure levels of this amount will lead to the loss
of a statistical life, whereas the value of life estimates cited above indicate that the value
of life from the standpoint of saving a statistical life is $3 million to $7 million dollars.
Surely these value of life estimates cannot be correct if these expenditures are only a
breakeven proposition in which as many statistical lives are lost as are being saved by
expenditures of this level. 20 To resolve these difficulties, Viscusi (1994) developed a
methodology whereby there would be a linkage between the level of expenditure that
would lead to the loss of a statistical life and the value of a statistical life from the
standpoint of society’s willingness to pay to reduce risk. In particular, the risk-risk
analysis measure of the opportunity cost of saving a life equals the estimated value of life
divided by the marginal propensity to consume health-related expenditures, which he
estimated to be 0.1. The result was that the level of expenditures leading to the loss of a
statistical life would be $50 million.21
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Thus far, there is general agreement on the concept, 22 but it has not yet been
adopted for widespread policy use because there is not yet any consensus regarding the
appropriate magnitude of the empirical value that should be used. As a practical matter,
if agencies actually adopted policies based on benefit-cost analysis, the use of the riskrisk tradeoff value would become largely superfluous. This technique emerged as an
alternative when the restrictive aspects of legislative provisions prevented the U.S. Office
of Management and Budget from rejecting policies based on their inordinately high cost
per life saved values. Even if agencies are not permitted to perform benefit-cost analysis,
the reasoning was that at least on balance they should reduce death risks rather than
increase them. So long as the opportunity cost in lives lost exceeds the risk gains from a
policy, these efforts will not only be wasteful of financial resources but on balance will
have an adverse health effect.

VI. Conclusion
Non-economists might view attaching a value to human life as the most
problematic of all undertakings. Such an effort is presumably not only immoral but also
unlikely to yield any estimates of practical import.
The opposite has in fact proven to be the case. The courts and regulatory agencies
long used human capital measures as determinants of the appropriate value of
compensation for fatalities and incorrectly used these measures to value the prevention of
fatalities. The more recent literature has focused on these prevention values under the
heading of the value of life, which in effect has inquired not about the value of life but
rather society’s willingness to pay for small risk reductions. This focus on the risk-
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money tradeoff for small changes in risk is convenient analytically, and can be linked to
market evidence for prices and wages that are in exchange for shifts in the individual risk
level. Focusing on the small risk changes also leads to an appropriate match to
government policies as well as most preventive risk decisions, since typically what is at
stake is not the certainty of life or death but rather small incremental shifts in the
probability of this adverse outcome. Estimates of the value of life in the labor market are
similar to those that have been obtained for product market contexts and in interview
studies. Because these values are in the millions per statistical life, there has been
considerably less controversy concerning the inappropriateness of these measures than
would have been the case if they had a more modest value comparable to the human
capital measure for lost earnings.
The result is that value of life estimates are now used routinely in benefit analyses
of risk reduction policies throughout the U.S. federal government. However, because of
restrictive legislative mandates, they often do not provide the guide to policy. Attempts
to use these values in court contexts for hedonic damages have largely been unsuccessful
because the value of life measure is not a compensation concept but is rather a measure of
the appropriate value of eliminating small risks. Adoption of this approach for
determining liability would be an appropriate role for these estimates, but there is no
evidence that this use of the value of the life estimates has made its way into the courts.
Another value of life concept that has been at the forefront of the recent economic
literature pertains to risk-risk analysis. Very wasteful expenditures may in fact have an
opportunity cost in terms of lives saved, which one might view as an expenditure level
that will lead to the loss of a statistical life. This concept has been the object of
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preliminary discussions both in the courts and the regulatory arena, but the methodology
has yet to be adopted on a widespread basis.
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Footnotes
1

For an early discussion of this principle, see Schelling (1968).

2

For a review of these public finance principles, see Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978).

3

Indeed, this approach was in fact widely used throughout the federal government. See

Rice and Cooper (1967).
4

Arrow (1971) articulates this general principle for optimal insurance for financial risks,

and a large number of authors have generalized this result for state-dependent utility
functions in which there is a utility function in good health and a utility function in ill
health.
5

The idea of making the victim whole is a routine result in the case of financial losses

and a desire to provide both efficient insurance and efficient deterrence. For background
on these fundamental law and economic principles, see Polinsky (1989), Posner (1998),
and Shavell (1987).
6

The underlying rationale is that as society has become richer, preferences for safety

have increased. For empirical evidence on this result see Viscusi (1978), and for further
discussion of its policy implications see Wildavsky (1988).
7

Estimates of the injury cost by industry based on this approach appear in Viscusi and

Zeckhauser (1994).
8

An early contribution to the hedonic price and wage literature Griliches (1971). See

Rosen (1986) for an extensive discussion.
9

Results for the United Kingdom appear in Jones-Lee (1989) and for the United States

appear in Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1991). Estimates of the value of cancer appear in
Magat, Viscusi, and Huber (1996).
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10

The key results from my report prepared for Secretary of Labor Donovan, “Analysis of

OMB and OSHA Evaluations of the Hazard Communication Proposal,” March 15, 1982,
are reported in Viscusi (1992), Chapter 14. The regulation was approved the day after
the report reached the White House.
11

See Moore and Viscusi (1988a and 1988b) and Viscusi and Moore (1989).

12

See, for example, the results in Jones-Lee (1989).

13

See the estimates in Viscusi and Evans (1990). For different formulations of the

model, the income elasticities are 0.67 and 1.10. Also, in Viscusi (1978) I show that
there are also wealth effects in the risk levels people select, as workers with greater
economic resources are more likely to select safer jobs.
14

Most but not all court cases have not permitted hedonic damages to be presented. For a

review of the case law in this area, see Ward and Ireland (1992, p. 413-430).
15

Ideally, one would want to couple compensatory damages with a fine paid to the state

to establish efficient incentives. Such a fine can, in effect, be levied through regulatory
sanctions in many instances.
16

See UAW v. OSHA, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit, 89-1559.
17

See letter to Nancy Risque Rohrbach, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department

of Labor, from James B. MacRae, Jr., Acting Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, March 10, 1992.
18

More specifically, Keeney (1990) fitted an exponential curve relating mortality risk to

income using 1959 data on mortality of whites, age 25-64.
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19

For a review of the range of these studies as well as direct evidence, see Lutter and

Morrall (1994) and Viscusi (1994).
20

There are other controversies as well. For example, improved individual health affects

income level so there are problems of simultaneity in estimating the relationship between
income and mortality rates.
21

This methodology has since been refined to recognize income related expenditures that

harm individual health, such as smoking and drinking. Such refinements indicate that the
risk-risk analysis measure for the expenditure level that leads to the loss of a statistical
life may be as low as $12 million, which is still substantially above the value of life
figure for saving a statistical life. See Lutter, Morrall, and Viscusi (1999).
22

For example, several articles in the University of Chicago Law Review (Fall 1996)

address this approach in a favorable manner.
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Table 1
Summary of Selected Value of Life Studies
Based on Labor Market Data
Author (Year)

Sample

Risk Variable

Mean
Risk
n/a

Implicit Value of
Life ($ millions)a
8.6

Smith (1974)

Industry data

Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS)

Smith (1976)

Current Population
Survey (CPS)

BLS

0.0001

5.5

Thaler and Rosen (1976)

Survey of Economic
Opportunity

Society of
Actuaries

0.001

1.0

Viscusi (1978, 1979)

Survey of Working
Conditions

BLS

0.0001

4.9

Brown (1980)

National Longitudinal
Survey of Young Men

Society of
Actuaries

0.002

1.8

Viscusi (1981)

Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID)

BLS

0.0001

7.7

Olson (1981)

CPS

BLS

0.0001

6.2

Arnould and Nichols (1983)

U.S. Census

Society of
Actuaries

0.001

1.1

Moore and Viscusi (1988a)

PSID

BLS

0.00005

3.0

Moore and Viscusi (1988a)

PSID

National
Traumatic
Occupational
Fatality Survey

0.00008

8.7

Kniesner and Leeth (1991)

Industry data for Japan

0.00003

13.8

Kniesner and Leeth (1991)

Industry data for
Australia

0.0001

3.9

Kniesner and Leeth (1991)

CPS data for U.S.

0.0004

0.7

a

Expressed in 1998:III prices using the GDP deflator for personal consumption
expenditures, as reported in the Economic Report of the President, 1999.
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Table 2

Summary of Selected Price-Risk Studies Based on
Product and Housing Market Data

Author (Year)

Nature of Risk, Year

Monetary Tradeoff

Implicit Value of
Life ($ millions)a
1.4

Blomquist (1979)

Automobile death risks,
1972

Estimated desirability
of seatbelts

Portney (1981)

Mortality effects of air
pollution, 1978

Property values

1.0

Ippolito and Ippolito (1984)

Cigarette smoking risks,
1980

Monetary equivalent
of risk information

0.8

Atkinson and Halvorsen (1990)

Automobile accident risks,
1986

Price of new
automobiles

4.8

Dreyfus and Viscusi (1998)

Used car purchases, 1988

Price of used cars

Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi
(1999)

Cancer risks from
hazardous waste sites,
1988-93

Housing price effects

a

3.4-4.8
4.2

All estimates are in 1998:III dollars using the GDP deflator for personal consumption
expenditures.
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Table 3
Regulatory Costs and Cost-Effectiveness in Saving Lives

Cost per life
saved, millions
of 1995 dollars
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.8
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.6
3.3
3.8
4.1
4.1

Cost per
normalized life
saved, 1995 dollars
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.9
0.9
1.0
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.0
1.9
2.0
2.2
2.2
4.8
2.6
4.0
3.8
10.1
10.1

Regulation

Year

Agency

Unvented space heater ban
Aircraft cabin fire protection standard
Seatbelt/air bag
Steering column protection standards
Underground construction standards
Trihalomethane in drinking water
Aircraft seat cushion flammability
Alcohol and drug controls
Auto fuel-system integrity
Auto wheel rim servicing
Aircraft floor emergency lighting
Concrete and masonry construction
Crane suspended personnel platform
Passive restraints for trucks and buses
Auto side-impact standards
Children’s sleepwear flammability ban
Auto side door supports
Low-altitude windshear equipment and training
Metal mine electrical equipment standards
Trenching and excavation standards
Traffic alert and collision avoidance systems
Hazard communication standard
Trucks, buses and MPV side-impact
Grain dust explosion prevention standards
Rear lap/shoulder belts for autos
Stds for radionuclides in uranium mines
Benzene NESHAP (original: fugitive
emissions)
Ethylene dibromide in drinking water
Benzene NESHAP (revised: coke by-products)
Asbestos occupational exposure limit
Asbestos occupational exposure limit
Benzene occupational exposure limit
Electrical equipment in coal mines
Arsenic emission standards for glass plants
Ethylene oxide occupational exposure limit
Arsenic/copper NESHAP
Hazardous waste listing of petroleum refining
sludge
Cover/move uranium mill tailings (inactive)

1980
1985
1984
1967
1989
1979
1984
1985
1975
1984
1984
1988
1988
1989
1990
1973
1970
1988
1970
1989
1988
1983
1989
1987
1989
1984
1984

CPSC
FAA
NHTSA
NHTSA
OSHA
EPA
FAA
FRA
NHTSA
OSHA
FAA
OSHA
OSHA
NHTSA
NHTSA
CPSC
NHTSA
FAA
MSHA
OSHA
FAA
OSHA
NHTSA
OSHA
NHTSA
EPA
EPA

1991
1988
1972
1986
1987
1970
1986
1984
1986
1990

EPA
EPA
OSHA
OSHA
OSHA
MSHA
EPA
OSHA
EPA
EPA

6.8
7.3
9.9
88.1
10.6
11.1
16.1
24.4
27.4
32.9

17.0
18.1
24.7
220.1
26.5
13.3
40.2
61.0
68.4
82.1

1983

EPA

37.7

94.3
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Table 3 cont.
Regulation

Year

Agency

Benzene NESHAP (revised: transfer
operations)
Cover/move uranium mill tailings (active sites)
Acrylonitrile occupational exposure limit
Coke ovens occupational exposure limit
Lockout/tagout
Arsenic occupational exposure limit
Asbestos ban
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) cattlefeed ban
Benzene NESHAP (revised: waste operations)
1, 2-Dechloropropane in drinking water
Hazardous waste land disposal ban
Municipal solid waste landfills
Formaldehyde occupational exposure limit
Atrazine/alachlor in drinking water
Hazardous waste listing for wood-preserving
chemicals

1990

EPA

1983
1978
1976
1989
1978
1989
1979
1990
1991
1988
1988
1987
1991
1990

EPA
OSHA
OSHA
OSHA
OSHA
EPA
FDA
EPA
EPA
EPA
EPA
OSHA
EPA
EPA

Cost per life
saved, millions
of 1995 dollars
39.2
53.6
61.3
75.6
84.4
127.3
131.8
148.6
200.2
777.4
4988.7
22746.8
102622.8
109608.5
6785822.0

Cost per
normalized life
saved, 1995 dollars
97.9
133.8
153.2
188.9
102.4
317.9
329.2
371.2
500.2
1942.1
12462.7
56826.1
256372.7
273824.4
16952364.9

Source: W. Kip Viscusi, Jahn K. Hakes, and Alan Carlin, (1997) “Measures of Mortality
Risks,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14(3), 228-229.
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Table 4
Benefits and Costs for Changes in Ford Pinto Gas Tank Design
A. Costs
Number of Units
11 million cars
1.5 million trucks

Unit Cost
$11
$11

TOTAL

$137.5 million

B. Benefits – Risks Avoided by Design Change
Ford’s Unit
Ford’s Total
Outcome of Faulty Design
Value
Value
180 burn deaths
$200,000
$36 million
180 serious burn injuries
$67,000
$12.1 million
2,100 burned vehicles
$700
$1.5 million
TOTAL

Total Cost
$121 million
$16.5 million

Unit Deterrence
Value
$5 million
$2.5 million
$700

Total Deterrence
Value
$900 million
$450 million
$1.352 billion

$49.6 million

Source: Viscusi (1991) and internal Ford engineering analysis for costs and Ford benefit
values.
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Figure 1
Market Process for Determining Compensating
Differentials
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